Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) likely to apply where tenant provides a service

Where a tenant provides services from leased premises in accordance with the permitted use the lease is likely to be a “retail premises lease” and therefore governed by the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic).

In every case it is necessary to identify precisely the service being provided, consider what activity is permitted under the lease and whether the service provided accords with the permitted use.

The Act applies to a “retail premises lease”.  “Retail’ is not defined; however, the expression “retail premises” is defined (s.4(1)):

“….premises, not including any area intended for use as a residence, that under the terms of the lease relating to the premises are used, or are to be used, wholly or predominantly for –

(a)   the sale or hire of goods by retail or the provision of services;”

(underlining added).

The authorities provide strong support for the ‘ultimate consumer’ test as the touchstone of retailing. In Wellington Union Life Insurance Society Limited [1991] 1 VR 333, Nathan J said at 336:

“The essential feature of retailing, is to my mind, the provision of an item or service to the ultimate consumer for fee or reward. The end user may be a member of the public, but not necessarily so.”

Wellington Union concerned the provision of a service: patent attorneys providing advice to large foreign chemical companies from rented premises. In some cases the advice passed through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer. Nathan J held that the premises were “retail premises”.

In Fitzroy Dental Pty Ltd v Metropole Management Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 344 (which also concerned the provision of a service) Croft J referred to Wellington Union at [16]:

“The fact that the advice of the patent attorneys may pass through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer or end user was not regarded as significant, provided it came into the hands of that person in a form that could not be amended and hence remained the product of the intellect of the deliverer. More generally, this highlights and emphasises the importance of characterising the nature of the “service” that is being provided. Thus, in the context of Wellington, it would follow that if the position was that the patent attorneys provided advice to, for example, a solicitor who would, in turn, provide advice to his or her client, the ultimate consumer, using the patent attorney’s advice merely as an “input” in his or her advice, wholly or partially with additions and modifications on the basis of his or her professional opinion, the position would be different. In those circumstances the patent attorney’s advice could not, in a relevant sense, be said to pass through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer. It does not, however, follow that in these circumstances the solicitor may not be regarded as the “ultimate consumer” of the service for the purposes of his or her own practice; as is likely to be the case with other “inputs” for the practice such as, for example, legal research services, stationary and office supplies.”

Most reported cases concern whether goods are being sold by retail. At [17] in Fitzroy Dental Croft J considered whether the sale of goods could be said to be “retail”;

“….. a sale of “widget type A” from premises by A to B who, in turn, “converts” the good “widget type A” to “widget type B for sale to C would not involve the sale of “widget type A” to C as the ultimate consumer of that type of good. Depending on the nature of the goods involved these transactions may involve sale by wholesale to B and a retail sale to C – or, alternatively, two retail sales of different goods, “widget type A” to B and “widget type B” to C.”

And at [18];

“… that the fact that a good or a service is provided to a person who uses the good or service as an “input” in that person’s business for the purpose of producing or providing a different good or service to another person does not detract from the possible characterisation of the first person (and perhaps also the second person, depending on all the circumstances) as the “ultimate consumer” of the original good or service.”

In CB Cold Storage Pty Ltd v IMCC Group Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 23 Croft J had to again consider whether rented premises were “retail premises”. The tenant conducted the business of a cold and cool storage warehouse storage from the premises which accorded with the permitted use under the lease. The tenant’s customers ranged from large primary production enterprises to very small owner operated businesses. VCAT held that the tenant’s rented premises were not “retail premises” on the basis that a “consumer” was a person who used goods or services to satisfy personal needs rather than for a business purpose and therefore the tenant’s customers were not consumers of the tenant’s services. The tenant appealed VCAT’s decision. Croft J allowed the appeal and held that the premises were “retail premises”. The Tribunal erred in holding that customers that used a tenant’s service for a business purpose were not “ultimate consumers”; the Tribunal treated the services provided at the premises as an “input” into the tenant’s customer’s business arrangements with the consequence that the tenant’s customers were not the ultimate consumers of the tenant’s services. The matter was not remitted to VCAT because the Tribunal had been satisfied of all other matters necessary to support a conclusion that the premises were “retail premises”: the premises were being used in accordance with the lease, were “open to the public” and there were no findings to support a conclusion that the premises were not “retail premises”.

CB Cold Storage highlights the importance of identifying the nature of the service being provided and the user or consumer of that service. In most cases the provision of a service will be “retail”.

Controversy resolved – but more tenants under 15 year leases lose protection of Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic)

Leased premises that are “retail premises” within the meaning of s.4(1) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 are excluded from the operation of the Act where the lease term is 15 years or longer and other conditions are met. See: ss.5(1)(c) and 4(2)(f) and the Ministerial Determination dated 23 August 2004.

The Ministerial Determination has the effect of removing premises from the operation of the Act where:

“Premises which are Leased under a Lease:

(a)        the term of which (excluding any options for renewal) is 15 years or longer; or

………..

and which contains any provisions that –

(d)       impose an obligation on the tenant or any other person to carry out any substantial work on the Premises which involves the building, installation, repair or maintenance of:-

(i)        the structure of, or fixtures in, the Premises; or

(ii)       the plant or equipment at the Premises; or

(iii)      the appliances, fittings or fixtures relating to a gas, electricity, water, drainage or other services; or

(e)        impose an obligation on the tenant or any other person to pay any substantial amount in respect of the cost of any of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (d)(i), (ii) or (iii); or

(f)        in any significant respect disentitles the tenant or any other person to remove any of the things specified in paragraph (d) at or at any time after the end of any of the leases to which paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) apply.

……………..”

The purpose of the Determination is unclear. Apart from statements by the Small Business Commission, there are no public documents that explain its purpose. The SBC says that the “purpose of the Determination is to exempt long term leases which impose substantial obligations on the tenant from the operation of the Act, where such exemption would be beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant”; the SBC refers, as an example of such a lease, to long term Crown leases for a low or peppercorn rent where substantial works are imposed on the tenant. See: the SBC “Guidelines to the Retail Leases Act 2003 – What are ‘retail premises’” dated 1 December 2014.

But it is unclear why the Determination applies only where it benefits both the landlord and the tenant. The application of the Determination is not restricted  to where the lease provides for a low or peppercorn rent: rent is not mentioned. Why should a tenant under a 15 year lease lose the protection of the Act where the tenant is required by the lease to undertake substantial work or pay for substantial work? Why should a tenant lose the benefit of the Act where it does substantial work and the lease disentitles the tenant from removing the work?

There has long been a debate about whether the “or” that appears between (e) and (f) should be read as an “and”. The issue is important because if “or” is the correct interpretation the number of leases excluded from the operation of the Act will increase. The SBC has said that the “or” should be read as an “and” and that this interpretation had been confirmed by the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office. See: the SBC’s Guidelines referred to above. Croft, Hay and Virgona in Retail Leases Victoria take a contrary view and say at [30,080.15] that (d), (e) and (f) “are clearly and expressly cast in the alternative…”.

The “or”/”and” controversy was considered and determined by VCAT in Luchio Nominees Pty Ltd v Epping Fresh Food Market Pty Ltd [ 2016] VCAT 937. In that case the tenant argued that for the Determination to apply (d) and (f) had to apply or (e) and (f) had to apply. Member Edquist rejected the tenant’s arguments saying at [52]:

“I do not agree that sub-paragraph (f) in the Determination assumes the prior application of either sub-paragraph (d) or sub-paragraph (e). This is because sub-paragraph (f), which defines the breadth of the prohibition against removal of things, is expressed to relate back to ‘any of the things specified in paragraph (d)’, rather than ‘any of the things specified in paragraphs (d) or (e)’.

As to the purpose of the Determination, the Tribunal held

[58]      …..The purpose of the Determination is, in my view, to clarify that certain long term leases or retail premises are to be deemed not be covered by the RLA…..

[59]      …..a construction of the Determination which requires the existence of both a provision of the type identified by sub-paragraph (d) and sub-paragraph (f), or both a provision of the type identified by sub-paragraph (e) and sub-paragraph (f), would necessarily reduce, potentially substantially, the number of leases caught by the Determination. Such a construction would, in my view, be inconsistent with the presumed purpose of the Determination.”

The real puzzle is why long term leases should be excluded from the Act.

 

Franchisees beware of arbitration clauses

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Prospective franchisees should be cautious about agreeing to the inclusion of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements. It is common for a franchisee to enter into an ‘occupancy’ or ‘licence’ agreement with an entity associated with the franchisor which entity is the lessee of the premises from which the franchisee will conduct its business.

 

At the sane tine the franchisee usually enters into a franchise agreement with the franchisor. The so-called ‘occupancy’ or ‘licence’ agreement commonly has all the characteristics of a lease with the consequence that the agreement is a lease. In Victoria, if the ‘occupancy’ or ‘licence’ agreement is a lease any dispute will constitute a  ‘retail tenancy dispute’ governed by Part 10 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (2003 Act).

 

VCAT has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine ‘retail tenancy disputes’.  If the dispute resolution provisions in the franchise agreement require that disputes under that agreement be referred to arbitration the franchisee could be in the difficult position of having to prosecute or defend two proceedings at the same time – one  in VCAT and another before an arbitrator.

 

This is the consequence of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Subway Systems Australia v Ireland [2014] VSCA 142. In that case the franchisee conducted its business from premises in Doncaster, Victoria.  The arbitration clause in the franchise agreement required the arbitration to take place in Queensland. VCAT held that the “licence” agreement was a sub-lease with the consequence that that dispute will be determined as a ‘retail premises dispute” in VCAT in Victoria under the 2003 Act.

 

VCAT also decided that it  could hear and determine the dispute under the franchise agreement. The Court of Appeal held that VCAT did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the dispute under the franchise agreement which will have to be heard and determined by an arbitrator in Queensland.

 

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VCAT is a “court” and therefore arbitration clause effective

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In  Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd v Ireland [2013] VSC 550 Croft J held that a requirement in a franchise agreement that disputes be referred to arbitration did not prevent VCAT hearing and determining the dispute.

The matter came before Croft J as an application for leave after a VCAT member declined to find that the Tribunal was bound by  s.8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic)) (CAA) to refer the dispute to arbitration.

In broad terms s.8 of the CAA requires a court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement to refer the matter to arbitration if one of the parties makes that request. Croft J held that VCAT was not a “court” for the purpose of s.8(1) and therefore VCAT was not bound to refer the dispute to arbitration.

In Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd v Ireland [2014] VSCA 142 the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from Justice Croft’s decision. Maxwell P and Beach JA held that VCAT was a “court” for the purposes of s.8 of the CAA. Kyrou AJA dissented. This means that the dispute must now be referred to arbitration. The Court of Appeal’s decision can be found here:

Subway Systems v Ireland_merged_17114[1]

 

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The fog is beginning to clear

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Section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 implies into a lease a term that the “landlord is responsible for maintaining in a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into:

“(a)      the structure of, and fixtures in, the retail premises; and

(b)      plant and equipment at the retail premises; and

(c)      the appliances, fittings and fixtures provided under the lease by the landlord relating to the gas, electricity, water, drainage or other services.

The section was considered in  Computers & Parts Land Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 2054 where it was held that a landlord was not required to maintain premises in “state of disrepair” that was “identical” to the state of disrepair when the lease was entered into; the state of repair “need not be any better than at the commencement of the lease” but had to be “the same benefit to the lessee as was agreed to be provided by the demise” (para [75]).  Section 52 was a “keep in repair” obligation as opposed to a “put in and keep in repair” obligation (paras [84] and [85]). The expression “keep in repair”:

“…could mean, in extreme circumstances, that the only course open to a landlord is to replace some aspect of rented premises, but only to the degree that it is necessary to give the tenant the same conditions as at the commencement of the tenancy.”

If parts failed they had to be replaced with replacement parts that  “in the absence of adequate second hand parts, might need to be new” (para [85]). While s 52 did not mandate compliance with any legislative standard, a landlord could not contravene “a building or related law or regulation” and if there were an “aspect of the building that was legal at the date of its construction but is no longer legal, repair of that aspect of the building would not be a betterment for the Tenant.”(para [88]).

The Tribunal rejected contentions that a landlord had to re-design an air conditioning system to remove design flaws or anomalies (para [90]) and replace the  system with one that operated better than the original system (para [96]) but accepted that there might be circumstances where a roof had to be replaced rather than repaired if it were to survive the duration of the tenancy (para [127]).

 

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