Posts Tagged Tenant
Retail premises leases can “jump out” of the Retail Leases Act
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Greens List, Landords, Lease, Leasing, Retail Lease Act 2003, retail tenancy dispute, Robert Hay, Robert Hay QC on August 1, 2019
Can a “retail premises lease” (within the meaning of s.11 of the Retail Leases Act 2003) cease to be a “retail premises lease” during its term? That long-standing question has finally been resolved.
In Verraty Pty Ltd v Richmond Football Club Ltd  VCAT 1073 the Tribunal held that a lease could cease to a “retail premises lease” during the lease term. The lease was for a term of 20 years commencing 7 May 1998. A variation made in 2004 effected a surrender and regrant with the consequence that a “retail premises lease” was entered into at that time. In April 2017 the tenant exercised an option to renew the Lease from 7 May 2018 for a term of 10 years. The landlord claimed that the lease had ceased to be a “retail premises lease” from 7 May 2016 because “occupancy costs” were $1,000,000 or more and that the renewed lease was not a “retail premises lease”.
The issues were:
(a) whether the lease ceased to be a “retail premises lease” for the period 7 May 2016 to 6 May 2017 and was therefore not governed by the Act;
(b) if yes to (a), did the lease remain outside the ambit of the Act for the period 7 May 2017 to 6 May 2018; and
(c) if yes to (b), was the renewed lease resulting from the exercise of the option a “retail premises lease”?
VCAT answered “yes” to each of the three questions.
Section 11 says, among other things, that the Act applies to a “retail premises lease”. Section 11(2) says that “….this Act only applies to a lease of premises if the premises are retail premises…at the time the lease is entered into….” (emphasis added)
While the Act does not contain a definition of “retail premises lease” the expression “retail premises” is defined in s.4(1). Where “occupancy costs” are $1,000,000 or more per annum premises are excluded from the definition of “retail premises” (s.4(2)(a)) and regulation 6 of the Retail Leases Regulations 2013). “Occupancy costs” are defined in s.4(3) to mean:
- the rent payable under the lease (s.4(3)(a)); and
- the outgoings, as estimated by the landlord, to which the tenant is liable to contribute under the lease (s.4(3)(b))
There is a note under s.4(3) that says s.46 requires the landlord to give the tenant a written estimate of the outgoings to which the tenant is liable to contribute.
The landlord alleged that the lease had ceased to be a “retail premises lease” on 7 May 2016 because the “occupancy costs” for the next 12 months were $1,000,000 or more.
The landlord gave the tenant an estimate of outgoings dated 12 May 2016 (Estimate) pursuant to s.46(2) of the Act for the landlord’s 12 month accounting period commencing on 7 May 2016. Section 46(3) requires an estimate to be given before a retail premises lease is entered into and in respect of each of the landlord’s accounting periods during the term of the lease, at least one month before the start of that period. Section 46(4) says that a tenant is not liable to contribute to any outgoings of which an estimate is required to be given to the tenant until the tenant is given that estimate. The Estimate was not given at least one month before the start of the landlord’s accounting period commencing 7 May 2016. The Estimate and the rent exceeded $1,000,000 for those 12 months.
On 3 May 2017 the landlord estimated the outgoings to which the tenant was liable to contribute for the 12 month accounting period commencing 7 May 2017. No written estimate was given to the tenant. The estimated outgoings and rent exceeded $1,000,000 for those 12 months.
The landlord contended that whether or not the lease was a “retail premises lease” was governed solely by s.4(3) and that s.46 was irrelevant – all the landlord had to do was make an estimate of outgoings – a written estimate did not have to be given to the tenant. Consequently, it did not matter that the Estimate was not given within the time prescribed by s.46(3). The landlord also contended that because the lease ceased to be a “retail premises lease” on 7 May 2016 it was not required to given a written estimate under s.46 for the year commencing 7 May 2017 – all it had to was make an estimate of the outgoings under s.4(3).
The tenant contended, among other things, that a “retail premises lease” could not cease to be a “retail premises lease” during its term but that if a lease could cease to be a “retail premises lease” all the provisions made void by the Act were not revived – the lease continued without those provisions. The lease contained a “ratchet clause” that prevented the rent from decreasing – such clauses in a “retail premises lease” are void (s.35(3)).
The Tribunal held that:
- a lease could cease to be a “retail premises lease” during its term – s.11(2) prescribed the time at which a lease had to be a “retail premises lease” for the Act to apply but said nothing about a lease ceasing to be a “retail premises lease”;
- the landlord had to give an estimate under s.46(1) for the year commencing 7 May 2016 and, because the Estimate was give late, any outgoings referable to the period 7 May 2016 to 12 May 2016 had to be excluded from the estimate of outgoings;
- even with outgoings for the period 7 May 2016 to 12 May 2016 excluded, “occupancy costs” exceeded $1,000,000 for the 12 months commencing 7 May 2016 with the consequence that the Act did not apply for those 12 months;
- because the Act did not apply it was not necessary for the landlord to give an estimate of outgoings under s.46 for the accounting period commencing 7 May 2017 – all that the landlord had to do was to make an estimate of outgoings as required by s.4(3);
- the landlord made an estimate of outgoings on 3 May 2017 and, because “occupancy costs” exceeded $1,000,000 for the 12 months commencing 7 May 2017, the Act did not apply for those 12 months;
- the renewed lease was not a “retail premises lease”; and
- clauses in a lease that were void while the lease was a “retail premises lease” (such as the “ratchet clause”) were not void once the Act ceased to apply.
The Tribunal also held that the note at the foot of s.4(3) referring to s.46 was no more than a reminder that if the lease were a retail premises lease the landlord had to comply with s.46.
The tenant is likely to seek leave to appeal.
The following propositions emerge from the case:
(i) where the commencing rent under a new lease does not exceed $1,000,000 for the first 12 months, before the lease is entered into the landlord should make an estimate of outgoings (under s.4(3)) for the first 12 months of the lease and keep a record of the making of the estimate;
(ii) where the estimate of outgoings plus the rent for the first 12 months exceeds $1,000,000 the lease will not be a “retail premises lease” and a written estimate of outgoings under s.46 need not be given to the tenant;
(iii) where the estimate of outgoings (made under s.4(3)) plus the rent for the first 12 months does not exceed $1,000,000 it is necessary to give a written estimate of outgoings pursuant to s.46 to the tenant;
(iv) a “retail premises lease” can cease to be such a lease during its term;
(v) a lease can cease to be a “retail premises lease” during its term because “occupancy costs” exceed $1,000,000 provided an estimate of outgoings has been given under s.46;
(vi) where a lease ceases to be a “retail premises lease” during its term the landlord should make an estimate of outgoings (under s.4(3) for each remaining 12 month accounting during the term but need not give a written estimate of outgoings (under s.46) to the tenant where “occupancy costs” exceed $1,000,000.
With respect to (vi), while the Tribunal did not determine whether a lease that has ceased to be a “retail premises lease” during its term can revert to being a “retail premises lease” during the term, it is likely that a lease can revert to being a “retail premises lease” during the term.
Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) likely to apply where tenant provides a service
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Leases, Landords, Lease, Leasing, Meaning of Retail Premises, Property Law, Retail lease, Retail Lease Act 2003, retail tenancy dispute, Robert Hay, Tenants on February 9, 2017
Where a tenant provides services from leased premises in accordance with the permitted use the lease is likely to be a “retail premises lease” and therefore governed by the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic).
In every case it is necessary to identify precisely the service being provided, consider what activity is permitted under the lease and whether the service provided accords with the permitted use.
The Act applies to a “retail premises lease”. “Retail’ is not defined; however, the expression “retail premises” is defined (s.4(1)):
“….premises, not including any area intended for use as a residence, that under the terms of the lease relating to the premises are used, or are to be used, wholly or predominantly for –
(a) the sale or hire of goods by retail or the provision of services;”
The authorities provide strong support for the ‘ultimate consumer’ test as the touchstone of retailing. In Wellington Union Life Insurance Society Limited  1 VR 333, Nathan J said at 336:
“The essential feature of retailing, is to my mind, the provision of an item or service to the ultimate consumer for fee or reward. The end user may be a member of the public, but not necessarily so.”
Wellington Union concerned the provision of a service: patent attorneys providing advice to large foreign chemical companies from rented premises. In some cases the advice passed through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer. Nathan J held that the premises were “retail premises”.
In Fitzroy Dental Pty Ltd v Metropole Management Pty Ltd  VSC 344 (which also concerned the provision of a service) Croft J referred to Wellington Union at :
“The fact that the advice of the patent attorneys may pass through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer or end user was not regarded as significant, provided it came into the hands of that person in a form that could not be amended and hence remained the product of the intellect of the deliverer. More generally, this highlights and emphasises the importance of characterising the nature of the “service” that is being provided. Thus, in the context of Wellington, it would follow that if the position was that the patent attorneys provided advice to, for example, a solicitor who would, in turn, provide advice to his or her client, the ultimate consumer, using the patent attorney’s advice merely as an “input” in his or her advice, wholly or partially with additions and modifications on the basis of his or her professional opinion, the position would be different. In those circumstances the patent attorney’s advice could not, in a relevant sense, be said to pass through the hands of an intermediary to the ultimate consumer. It does not, however, follow that in these circumstances the solicitor may not be regarded as the “ultimate consumer” of the service for the purposes of his or her own practice; as is likely to be the case with other “inputs” for the practice such as, for example, legal research services, stationary and office supplies.”
Most reported cases concern whether goods are being sold by retail. At  in Fitzroy Dental Croft J considered whether the sale of goods could be said to be “retail”;
“….. a sale of “widget type A” from premises by A to B who, in turn, “converts” the good “widget type A” to “widget type B for sale to C would not involve the sale of “widget type A” to C as the ultimate consumer of that type of good. Depending on the nature of the goods involved these transactions may involve sale by wholesale to B and a retail sale to C – or, alternatively, two retail sales of different goods, “widget type A” to B and “widget type B” to C.”
And at ;
“… that the fact that a good or a service is provided to a person who uses the good or service as an “input” in that person’s business for the purpose of producing or providing a different good or service to another person does not detract from the possible characterisation of the first person (and perhaps also the second person, depending on all the circumstances) as the “ultimate consumer” of the original good or service.”
In CB Cold Storage Pty Ltd v IMCC Group Pty Ltd  VSC 23 Croft J had to again consider whether rented premises were “retail premises”. The tenant conducted the business of a cold and cool storage warehouse storage from the premises which accorded with the permitted use under the lease. The tenant’s customers ranged from large primary production enterprises to very small owner operated businesses. VCAT held that the tenant’s rented premises were not “retail premises” on the basis that a “consumer” was a person who used goods or services to satisfy personal needs rather than for a business purpose and therefore the tenant’s customers were not consumers of the tenant’s services. The tenant appealed VCAT’s decision. Croft J allowed the appeal and held that the premises were “retail premises”. The Tribunal erred in holding that customers that used a tenant’s service for a business purpose were not “ultimate consumers”; the Tribunal treated the services provided at the premises as an “input” into the tenant’s customer’s business arrangements with the consequence that the tenant’s customers were not the ultimate consumers of the tenant’s services. The matter was not remitted to VCAT because the Tribunal had been satisfied of all other matters necessary to support a conclusion that the premises were “retail premises”: the premises were being used in accordance with the lease, were “open to the public” and there were no findings to support a conclusion that the premises were not “retail premises”.
CB Cold Storage highlights the importance of identifying the nature of the service being provided and the user or consumer of that service. In most cases the provision of a service will be “retail”.
Valuers must furnish detailed reasons for rental determinations under Retail Leases Act
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Landords, Leasing, Rent valuation, Retail lease, Retail Lease Act 2003, retail tenancy dispute, Robert Hay, valuation on June 2, 2016
Valuers determining the “current market rent” rent under leases concerning retail premises must ensure that the valuation:
- contains “detailed reasons” for the determination; and
- “specify the matters to which the valuer had regard in making the determination”.
See: s.37(6)(b) and (c) of the Retail Leases Act 2003.
Both requirements must be met; a determination that specified the matters to which the valuer had regard but failed to provide detailed reasons for the determination would not comply with s.37(6).
In Higgins Nine Group Pty Ltd v Ladro Greville St Pty Ltd  VSC 244 Justice Croft had to consider what was required of a valuer in “giving detailed reasons” and “specifying the matters” to which he or she had regard in making the determination. Higgins concerned an application for leave to appeal from a decision given in VCAT.
After reviewing case law concerning provisions in New South Wales similar to s.37(6), His Honour said at  that it was not sufficient for a valuer to “leap to a judgment”: the valuation “must disclose the steps of reasoning” and that both the Victorian and NSW provisions “eschew and do not entertain any ‘blinding flash or light’ as satisfying their ‘requirements’”.
In Higgins the valuer examined the tenant’s financial records and determined the rent using the “profits method” of valuation for determining the rent. The tenant had a 24 hour liquor licence but traded only to 11pm. The valuer referred to the tenant’s actual sales and determined that an additional $536,782 was achievable in annual turnover for the business, being a 26% increase over the actual sales. The only indicator as to how that figure was arrived at was in comments made by the valuer in a document furnished after the valuation was made where he said the figure was derived:
“Based on the liquor licence in place, and comparable venues in the region which I hold on file.”
No details of the comparable venues were furnished.
The landlord sought to defend the valuation on the basis that it was an opinion of an expert and, given the valuer’s experience, that was sufficient in terms of reasoning for the purpose of s.37(6).
Justice Croft rejected the landlord’s argument and refused refused leave to appeal. His Honour referred to and agreed with the following analysis of the valuation given by the Tribunal:
“One might speculate that the Valuer placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Tenant traded up until 11 pm in circumstances where the 24 hour liquor licence allowed it to trade well beyond that time. However, having to speculate as to how the Valuer formed his opinion is, in my view, contrary to what is required under s.37(6) of the Act. Moreover, no detail was provided as to what other venues were used as a comparator. That, of itself, raises a number of questions: Did those other venues have similar GLAR? Did they have the same type of liquor licence? Were they also being operated as a restaurant/bar? Was their location proximate or did they cater for the same demographic clientele? Without those details, I consider the reasoning to be deficient and not in accordance with the Act.”
His Honour said at  that the valuer’s reference to an undisclosed file of material upon which he had made an assessment was “worse than a mere ‘blinding flash of light’” and that the reasoning process was “entirely opaque”.
When a valuer is engaged the parties should refer the valuer to the requirement in s.37(6) to both provide detailed reasons and specify the matters to which the valuer had regard. A determination based on an opinion that does not disclose the valuer’s reasoning will not comply with s.37(6).
Tenants should dispute rent nominated by landlord within time period specified in the lease
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Law, Commercial Leases, Contract Law, Landords, Leasing, Retail Lease Act 2003, Robert Hay, Robert Hay SC on March 11, 2015
Tenants should dispute the rent specified by a landlord at a rent review date within the time specified by the lease. Dire consequences can follow if the time periods are ignored . The rent review process for setting the market rent commonly provides for:
- the landlord to propose the new rent and, if the tenant does not object within a specified period of time, the rent proposed by the landlord is the new rent;
- the rent to be determined by a valuer if the tenant objects to the rent proposed by the landlord.
The question often arises whether time is of the essence in the construction of clauses concerning rent reviews.
The starting point is the House of Lords decision United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council (1978) AC 904. In Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 (CA) Gleeson CJ referred with apparent approval to a summary of the effect of United Scientific in the judgment of Slade LJ in Trustees of Henry Smith’s Charity v AWADA Trading and Promotion Services Ltd (1983) 47 P & CR 607, 619 as follows:
“(1) Where a rent review clause confers on a landlord or tenant a right for his benefit or protection, as part of the procedure for ascertaining the new rent, and that right is expressed to be exercisable within a specified time, there is a rebuttable presumption of construction that time is not intended to be of the essence in relation to any exercise of that right.
(2) In a case where the presumption applies, the other party concerned may, if he wishes to bring matters to a head after the stipulated time for the exercise of the right has expired, give to the owner of the right a notice specifying a period within which he requires the right to be exercised, if at all; the period thus specified will if it is reasonable then become of the essence of the contract …
(3) The presumption is rebuttable by sufficient ‘contraindications in the express words of the lease or in the interrelation of the rent review clause itself and other clauses or in the surrounding circumstances.’ …
(4) Though the best way of rebutting the presumption is to state expressly that stipulations as to the time by which steps provided for by the rent review clause are to be taken is to be treated as being of the essence (see United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Bunley Borough Council per Lord Diplock [ AC] at 936, and per Lord Salmon [ AC] at 947), this is not the only way. Any form of expression which clearly evinces the concept of finality attached to the end of the period or periods prescribed will suffice to rebut the presumption. The parties are quite free to contract on the basis that time is to be of the essence if they so wish.”
The authorities make it plain that it is a question of construction of a lease whether there is express or implied rebuttal of the presumption that time is not of the essence
In Mailman the rent review provision the lease allowed the tenant a specific time to dispute the lessor’s assessment of the market rent and spelt out the consequence of failing to dispute the assessment within than time. There was no clause stating that time was of the essence. The relevant clauses were as follows:
“Prior to the expiration of fourteen (14) days…[from the service of the lessor’s notice], the Lessee may, by notice in writing, dispute the amount set out..[in the Lessor’s notice}…(clause 2.02(b))”
Another clause provided that if the lessee did not serve a notice of dispute within the prescribed time it was deemed to have agreed that the amount set out in the notice was current market rental.
The Court of Appeal held unanimously that the lease evidenced an intention that the 14 day time stipulation was of the essence. The decisive factor was the deeming of the tenant to have agreed to the rent if it failed to serve the notice of dispute.
The issue of whether time periods in rent review clauses are of the essence was revisited recently in Sentinel Asset Management Pty Ltd v Primo Moratis  QSC 200. The tenant failed to serve a notice disputing the rent specified by the landlord within the time prescribed by the lease with the consequence that iff time was of the essence the rent would increase by 22%. The critical clause provided that:
“Unless the Tenant gives the Landlord a notice stating that the Tenant’s assessment of the current annual market rent of the Premises at the relevant Market Review Date within 30 days after the Landlord gives the its notice, the Rent on and from the relevant Market Review Date is the current annual market rent in the Landlord’s notice.”
The lease also said that if “the Tenant gives a notice…. on time” (underlining added) the parties must attempt to agree the rent in writing failing which a valuer could be be appointed to determine the market rent.
The court found that time was of the essence with the consequence that the rent specified by the landlord applied.
The court also rejected an argument that the rent specified by the landlord had to be “reasonable”. The rent specified by the landlord in its notice was higher than the rent contained in an expert valuation obtained by the landlord.
The lesson is that it is critical for tenants to respond within the time prescribed by the lease.
Lessor’s purpose for demolishing leased building is irrelevant
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Law, Commercial Leases, Demolition clauses, Leasing, Property Law, Retail Lease Act 2003, Tenants, Termination notices on February 18, 2015
Leases commonly permit a landlord to terminate a lease if the landlord intends to demolish the building located on the leased premises. Section 56 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) implies terms into a retail premises lease that provides for the termination of lease on the grounds that the building is to be demolished. Section 56(2) of the Act says:
The landlord cannot terminate the lease on that ground unless the landlord has—
(a) provided the tenant with details of the proposed demolition that are sufficient to indicate a genuine proposal to demolish the building within a reasonably practicable time after the lease is to be terminated; and
(b) given the tenant at least 6 months’ written notice of the termination date.
Tenants often claim that a proposal is not a “genuine proposal” because the landlord intends to demolish the building so that the new building constructed on the site can be used for the landlord’s own purpose or for the purpose of leasing to a new party. However, the claim is misconceived because the purpose for which a landlord wishes to “demolish” leased premises is irrelevant to the question of whether there is a “genuine proposal”.
Assuming that enough detail is provided in the notice of termination concerning the proposed demolition, the only question is whether there is a genuine proposal to demolish. The term “demolish” is widely defined in s.56(7). In Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 17,259 Bryson J said at  that the lessor “should have a genuine proposal to demolish the building within a reasonably practical time after the lease is to be terminated.” Blackler concerned s.35 of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) which contained a demolition clause in similar terms to s.56 of the Act. Bryson J identified the question for determination as whether the notice itself provided sufficient details to indicate a genuine proposal.
At  His Honour said:
The requirement to provide details is not merely a formal step imposed in the lessor’s path, but the details are to be provided so that the lessee can come to a conclusion about whether the termination will be effective, and whether the lessee should accept that it will be effective or dispute it. The sufficiency of details provided should be tested in relation to that purpose. The question is whether the details provided are sufficient to indicate a genuine proposal to demolish the building; if they are not the termination cannot take place and if they are it will be effective no matter what other details of the proposed demolition exist or could have been provided.
And at :
It is not in my view open to contention by the lessee whether the lessor’s decision to demolish, repair, renovate or reconstruct the building is reasonable or appropriate; it is sufficient if there is a genuine proposal. Nor in my opinion is it open to debate whether the lessor could in some way modify the lessor’s proposal so as to continue to accommodate the lessee after the premises have been demolished, repaired, renovated or reconstructed. The opportunity to break a lease, retake possession of take advantage of the demolition clause is a contractual opportunity made available to the lessor by the terms of the lease itself, ……, it is not injurious to the lessor’s position whether the lessor has decided to take advantage, and it is not relevant that the lessor has in view occupying the premises itself, or selling them after reconstruction, or leasing them again, even if the lease should be a business similar to the lessee’s. The demolition clause is a reality of the party’s relationship, and so is its potential operation to end the lease.
See also .
In Skiwing Pty Ltd v Trust Company of Australia  NSWCA 276 the Court of Appeal held that a proposed “refurbishment redevelopment or extension” did not lose the character of a “genuine proposal” because the commercial motivation of the lessor was to attract a tenant or particular kind of tenant. See: Skiwing at  (Spigelman CJ (with whom Hodgson JA and Bryson JA agreed). Skiwing concerned a relocation notice given under s.34A of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) which provision was described at  as a “parallel formulation” to that considered by Bryson J in Blackler. The Court of Appeal at  said that Bryson J in Blackler was “correct”.
In Blackler Bryson J also accepted at  that there was an implied duty of good faith in the exercise of the contractual right to terminate the lease. However, the duty of good faith was not breached where the landlord had an intention to occupy the premises itself or lease them out to an identified person after the works had been carried out. His Honour said at :
The defendant can exercise its power to terminate the lease with a view to its own advantage; it is for purposes of that kind that contractual entitlements generally exist.
“Claw back” of lease incentives thrown into doubt
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Leases, Landords, Lease incentives, Leasing, Penalties, Property Law, Robert Hay SC, Tenants on November 19, 2014
Landlords often offer incentives to a tenant to encourage the tenant to enter a lease. Common incentives are rent free periods and contributions to the fit out. The logic behind the inducement is that landlord will benefit because the tenant will occupy the premises for the term of the lease. Landlords sometimes require a “claw back” provision in the lease so that if the landlord terminates the lease before the expiry of the term the lease incentive (or part of the lease incentive) must be repaid.
The enforceability of “claw back” clauses has been thrown into doubt by the decision of the Queensland Supreme Court in GWC Property Group Pty Ltd v Higginson  QSC 264.
In GWC the tenant and the landlord entered into a lease and on the same day entered into an incentive deed. The incentive deed was recited to “supplement the lease” and recited that the landlord had agreed, among other things, to contribute to the tenant’s fit-out and grant a rent abatement. The lease did not require the tenant to undertake a fit-out. The incentive deed also provided for repayment of part of the landlord’s contributions if the lease was terminated (other than by expiry of the term or the lessor’s default) or if the tenant parted with possession without the landlord’s consent. The obligation to repay was guaranteed by guarantors.
The landlord terminated the lease after the leased premises were abandoned by the tenant. The court decided that:
- the lease and the incentive deed had to be construed as if they were one document;
- the obligation to repay only arise if there a termination;
- the tenant could be obliged to repay the landlord’s contributions for reasons other than the tenant’s breach – for example where the tenant went into liquidation or following a natural disaster;
- the repayment obligation should not be viewed as a restitutionary payment;
- in addition to contractual damages for breach of the lease, the landlord was entitled, by the repayment clauses, to recover substantial additional payments;
- the repayment obligation were not a genuine pre-estimate of damage.
The court decided that the obligation to repay landlord’s contributions was a penalty and was therefore not enforceable.
The case contains a good discussion about the law of penalties. Thanks to Tony Burke of Burke & Associates Lawyers Pty Ltd for alerting me to GWC.
Rent reviews – mandatory or at the landlord’s discretion?
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Law, Commercial Leases, Contract Law, Leasing, Property Law, Retail Lease Act 2003, Robert Hay on November 13, 2014
The issue of whether a lease requires a rent review or whether the review is at the discretion of the landlord often arises. The problem can avoided by clear drafting. In Growthpoint Properties Australian Limited v Austalia Pacific Airports  VSC 556 the court had to decide whether a rent review was mandatory under the lease or whether the review was at the discretion of the landlord.
Clause 4.2 of the lease provided that:
“On each Market Review Date, the Rent is to be adjusted by a market review in accordance with the Market Review Method….”
Part B of the Lease provided:
“On each Market Review Date, the Rent will be adjusted by a market review if:
(a) APAM gives written notice to the Tenant (“Rent Review Notice”) setting out APAM’s opinion of the market rent for the Premises as at the Market Review Date; and
(b) the Rent Review Notice is given to the Tenant in the period between 6 months before and 6 months after the Market Review Date.
New Rent applies unless a dispute notice is served.
The Rent stated in the Rent Review Notice applies from the Market Review Date unless the Tenant gives APAM a notice disputing the specified Rent (“Dispute Notice”) within 21 days after the Rent Review Notice is given.”
The controversy between the tenant and the landlord arose from the imperative language in clause 4.2 (“is to be adjusted”) and the use of the conditional language in Part B (“will be adjusted”).
The tenant contended that the clauses, when read together were ambiguous and that there was a conflict between the clauses. On the tenant’s construction of the lease the landlord was obliged to initiate a rent review.
The landlord submitted that the rent provisions gave the landlord an entitlement, but not an obligation, to give the lessee a rent review notice.
The court held that the rent provisions gave the landlord an entitlement, but not an obligation, to give the lessee a rent review notice.
The case is useful because it discusses in detail the principles governing the construction of leases and rent review clauses and highlights the need to examine the lease as a whole. Of particular interest is the discussion about the purpose of rent review clauses: the House of Lords in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council  AC 904 viewed the benefit of a rent review to the landlord as being the ability to adjust rent market with the benefit to the tenant being seen as the security of a long lease.
The lease in Growthpoint was a commercial lease. If the lease is a “retail premises lease” a tenant may initiate a rent review if the landlord fails to do so within 90 days after the period provided for in the lease for the review. See: s.35(5) of the Retail Leases Act 2003.
NSW Court departs from general rule on drawing down of bank guarantees
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Bank Guarantee, Commercial Leases, Disputes, Guarantee, Leasing, Property Law on August 29, 2014
There is a translation key(widget) on the mirrored blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals. The mirrored blog can be found at http://roberthaybarrister.blogspot.com.au/
Courts have traditionally treated an interlocutory application to restrain the calling upon or use of money secured by a bank guarantee or other performance bond as being in a special category.
The authorities were summarised in Cerasola TLS AG v Thiess Pty Ltd & John Hollandd  QSC 115 as follows:
On the basis of those authorities, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the general rule is that a court will not enjoin the issuer of a performance guarantee from performing its unconditional obligation to make payment. A number of exceptions to that general rule have been identified. They are identified in Clough Engineering at  as:
(1) An injunction will issue to prevent a party in whose favour the performance guarantee has been given from acting fraudulently.
(2) An injunction will issue to prevent a party in whose favour the performance guarantee has been given from acting unconscionably in contravention of the Trade Practice Act 1974 (Cth).
(3) While the Court will not restrain the issuer of a performance guarantee from acting on an unqualified promise to pay if the party in whose favour the guarantee has been given has made a contractual promise not to call upon the bond, breach of that contractual promise may be enjoined on normal principles relating to the enforcement by injunction of negative stipulations in contracts.
See: also Otter Group Pty Ltd v Wylaars  VSC 98 at  where the summary was referred to with approval.
This general rule is the product of appellate authorities. See: Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443, Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd  3 VR 812; Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New Zealand Ltd (1999] 1 VR 420 and Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd & Ors (2000) 249 ALR 458.
The rationale for the general rule is that by providing for security to be given, the parties implicitly agree that the party giving the security deposit shall be out of pocket pending resolution of the underlying dispute.
In Clough, the Full Federal Court said at  that “clear words will be required to support a construction which inhibits a beneficiary from calling on a performance guarantee where a breach is alleged in good faith, that is, non-fraudulently.”
The Supreme Court of New South Wales in Universal Publishers Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees  NSWSC 2012 appears to have departed from the general rule in circumstances where there were no clear words preventing the landlord calling on the bank guarantee and there was no issue that the landlord was acting in good faith. The lease did not contain any negative stipulations on the landlord’s right to call on the guarantee. The tenant disputed that there was any breach. The landlord submitted that the authorities referred to above made it clear that the existence of a dispute as to whether there was an actual breach was not an answer to an invocation of the guarantee. See: para .
In Universal the tenant obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the landlord from drawing on the bank guarantee. The proceeding then concerned whether the injunction should be discharged.
Clause 19.1 of the lease required the tenant to provide an “unconditional” bank guarantee to “secure the Lessee’s obligations under this Lease”.
Clause 19.4 provided that:
19.4. In the event that the lessee:
22.214.171.124 defaults in the payment of Rent or in the performance or compliance of any other obligations under this Lease; or
126.96.36.199 breaches any other obligation, term, condition or covenant under this Lease,
the Lessor is hereby authorised to demand that the guaranteeing bank pay to the Lessor such amount that (in the reasonable opinion of the Lessor) may be due to the Lessor as a result of such default, breach or non-observance by the Lessee or termination of the Lease pursuant to it.
The Court determined that there had to be an actual breach before the landlord could form an opinion as to the amount that might be due. See: para . As to whether there was an actual breach did not depend on a judicial determination but on whether the tenant could establish that there was a serious question to be tried about whether there was a breach. See: paras  and .
The Court held that clause 19.1 did not provide for an allocation of the risk as to who should be out of pocket while a dispute as to the lessee’s asserted breach was determined. See: para .
The lesson from Universal is that the parties to a lease should ensure that the provisions concerning the drawing down of the guarantee specifically define the circumstances when the landlord can draw down on the guarantee. In particular, solicitors acting for landlords should, rather than relying on the general rule referred to above, ensure that the lease refers to the landlord’s entitlement to draw down on a guarantee where the landlord believes in good faith that the tenant has breached the lease.
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From 31 July 2014, liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation
Media Presentation By Robert Hay
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Commercial Leases, Greens List, Leasing, Meaning of Retail Premises, Property Law, Retail Lease Act 2003, Robert Hay, You tube Videos - Greens List on August 11, 2014
Re-entry and Relief from Forfeiture in Commercial Leases
Robert Hay – Greens List
My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/
Parties can agree to higher standard than that imposed by s.52 of Retail Leases Act
Posted by ROBERT HAY QC COMMERCIAL LAW BARRISTER in Landords, Leasing, Retail Lease Act 2003, The Land Act 1958 on June 17, 2014
There is a translation key(widget) on this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals. http://roberthaybarrister.blogspot.com.au/
Section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 implies into a “retail premises” lease an obligation on landlords to maintain “in a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into” things such as the “structure of, and fixtures in” the premises, “plant and equipment at retail premises” and “the appliances, fittings and fixtures provided under the lease by the landlord relating to the gas, electricity, water drainage or other services”.
When is the lease entered into if an option is exercised? Is it the date when the lease commenced or when the new lease arising by reason of the option being exercised commences?
In Ross-Hunt Pty Ltd v Cianjan Pty Ltd the Tribunal held that that the relevant date was the date that the new term commenced following the exercise of an option and not the commencing date of the first term of the lease.
A further question then arose about whether a provision in a lease that imposes a higher standard on a landlord than that imposed by s.52 is void under s.94 on the ground that it is contrary to or inconsistent with s.52.
In Savers INC (ARB 075 452 185) v Herosy Nominees[the Tribunal held that if parties wished to contract for more than was provided for under s.52 they were free to do so; in that case the leases (and earlier leases to which the landlords and tenant were parties) contained terms that obliged the landlords to undertake repairs to the premises and imposed obligations that were more onerous than those imposed by s.52.
In the recent decision of Di & Li Australia Pty Ltd v Jin Dun Pty Ltd Senior Member Riegler rejected an argument that lease provisions which imposed more onerous obligations on the landlord than those imposed by s.52 were void. The Senior Member said:
“ In my view, s 52 does not prohibit the parties from agreeing to extend the Landlord’s obligations to repair or maintain its installations. The situation might be different if s 52 was expressed as a provision limiting a landlord’s obligation to maintain plant and equipment to a condition consistent with its condition when the lease was entered into. However, the provision does not expressly limit a landlord’s obligations but rather, imposes what I consider to be a minimum obligation on a landlord.
 There is nothing inconsistent or contrary to s 52 for the parties to increase that obligation and in the present case, it made eminent sense for the Landlord to continue to have that obligation upon renewal, given that it held the reversionary interest in the plant and equipment.
Further, it is not the case that s 52 is devoid of any limitation. In particular, sub-section (3) sets out various circumstances which limit its operation.
Those circumstances do not include limiting the comparator to the commencement of the Lease.
In my opinion, it was open for Parliament to have limited the operation of s 52(2) of the Act to the current term by stating words to the effect that a lease is not to include a term which requires the landlord to maintain plant and equipment, other than in a condition commensurate with the condition of the plant and equipment at the commencement of the lease.
However, the section is not expressed in such prohibitory terms, nor is it expressed to indicate any intention on the part of the legislature to ‘cover the field’ in respect of a landlord’s repair liability.”
  VCAT 829.
2011] VCAT 1160
  VCAT 349
There is a translation key(widget) on this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals. http://roberthaybarrister.blogspot.com.au/